Structur Price Commitments The paper goes on to explore and endorse the idea of structur price commitments wherein all holders of potentially relevant patents agree to a price cap on royalties just fore a standard is set—after which the standard setting body is prohibit from discussing pricing. Price commitments have the potential to create a scenario that is inde fair reasonable and nondiscriminatory.

This model may not work unless

Everyone agrees to adopt it. Oftentimes more than one organization will compete to set standards for technologies with similar functions each competing for market share Thailand Telegram Number Data in the standardization business—in other words to set the most standardiz standard. you ll get multiple standards bodies fighting it out Lerner says. One way to compete for the st patents is to offer terms that are more relax than those of the competing standard setting organization. And for an intellectual property owner relax rules are more attractive than strict rules. If you re a patent owner and one SSO has a rule that makes you cap your price and the other doesn t you can see why the temptation.

Would  to decide not to take part in the standard

With pricing commitment rules and instead to go with a standard where you re free to price things as you wish Lerner says. Thus the paper concludes the only way China Phone Number List to make structur pricing work is to enact a feral policy that mandates it—despite inevitable protestations from big firms with thousands of standards potential patents. It s clear why these firms would protest Lerner says. But if such a policy is encourag by antitrust bodies and courts it could  neficial for society as a whole and for technological regulation.